Illusory Losses by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2007
Illusory Losses
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Illusory Losses" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 340, 2007).
CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 340 
(2D SERIES) 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 164 
 
 
ILLUSORY LOSSES 
 
Cass R. Sunstein 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
 
May 2007, revised July 2007 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=983810 
Preliminary draft 7/4/07 
All rights reserved 
 
 
Illusory Losses 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Recent empirical work demonstrates that people’s self-reported happiness is 
surprisingly resilient to many large changes in life conditions; apparently significant  
adverse events and conditions often inflict  little or no hedonic damage. People with 
disabilities—such as those on dialysis, with lost limbs, or with colostomies—appear to 
show the same level of happiness or life-satisfaction as people without disabilities. The 
reason for these results is people’s power of adaptation. Adaptation has several sources, 
but it is often a product of attention: Most of the time, people go about their lives without 
attending to, or focusing on, adverse conditions, and hence those conditions inflict little 
hedonic harm. And if people make “hedonic judgment errors” about their own lives, they 
are highly likely to make such errors when assessing hedonic losses experienced by other 
people. These findings have important implications for the legal system, especially in the 
context of awards for pain, suffering, and hedonic losses. A special problem is that if 
people adapt to adverse changes because they cease to focus on them, the context of 
litigation will produce a serious distortion, because the attention of juries and judges is 
specifically focused on adverse changes.  But there are two qualifications. First, some 
injuries do inflict significant hedonic losses, because people cannot help focusing on 
them; chronic pain, anxiety, and depression are the most obvious examples. Second, 
people may suffer “capability loss” without suffering hedonic loss, and the legal system 
should award compensation for “capability damages.”  
These claims have broader implications for many questions of law and policy, 
including appropriate priority-setting for governments concerned with the welfare of 
their citizens. For example, increases in Gross Domestic Product are not much 
correlated with increases in self-reported happiness, in a way that raises serious 
questions about the focus on GDP; but GDP growth is closely correlated with social 
gains, such as increased longevity, that are not captured by self-reported happiness. The 
simplest conclusion is that pervasive existence of hedonic judgment errors raises the 
possibility that both economic and regulatory policies are misdirected. 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Elizabeth Emens, Robert Hahn, Peter Huang, 
Christine Jolls, Eric Posner, Margo Schlanger, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a previous 
draft, and to Madeline Fleisher and Matthew Robson for superb research assistance. Thanks too to 
participants in a workshop at Harvard Law School and a conference on the legal implications of recent 
happiness research, held at the University of Chicago Law School in June 2007; George Loewenstein and 
Peter Ubel provided especially helpful comments. 
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“Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about 
it.”1 
 
I. Six Claims 
 
In this Essay I attempt to defend six principal claims: 
 
1. In advance, people greatly exaggerate the hedonic effects of many adverse events, 
largely because they do not anticipate their remarkable capacity to adapt to 
changes. This capacity stems in part from a distinctive feature of human attention: 
Those who suffer many losses do not focus, constantly or much, on those losses. 
It follows that many losses are illusory or at least exaggerated, in the sense that 
they inflict far less hedonic damage than people anticipate.  
2. Both judges and juries are likely to make hedonic judgment errors, in a way that 
produces inflated damage awards. The reason for these errors is that the legal 
system asks people to focus on, and thus to attend to, losses to which plaintiffs 
might well devote little attention in their ordinary lives. In short, the legal system 
almost certainly produces focusing illusions in tort cases. 
3. It is important for the legal system to distinguish between harms that impose 
enduring losses, such as chronic pain and mental illness, and harms that do not, 
such as losses of fingers and toes. The distinction between enduring and illusory 
losses—for which ringing in the ears and loss of toes are illustrative cases—has 
many implications for economic and regulatory policy. 
4. Without acknowledging that it is doing so, the legal system appears to be 
awarding “capability damages” under the name of hedonic damages. Juries award 
damages for the loss of capabilities, even in contexts in which people are not 
suffering a loss in the enjoyment of their lives.  
5. It would be desirable to reform the legal system with the aid of a Civil Damages 
Schedule, designed to accomplish three distinctive tasks: (a) translating hedonic 
losses into monetary terms, (b) correcting hedonic judgment errors, and (c) 
assessing capability damages where appropriate. 
                                                 
1 Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler, Utility Maximization and Expected Utility, 20 J Econ Pesp 
221, 229 (2006). 
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6. An understanding of hedonic judgment errors raises the serious possibility that 
many policies, both fiscal and regulatory, are ill-directed. Government might be 
expending resources in the false hope that the expenditures will improve well-
being. There are complex questions, however, about the relationships between 
hedonic effects and the ingredients of good lives. A sensible society is not 
concerned only about “happiness” or even subjective well-being, though both of 
these certainly matter. 
 
Now for the details. 
 
II. Dollars and Welfare 
 
The legal system must often assign monetary values to actual or apparent welfare 
losses. When those losses are purely monetary, the assignment need not be difficult. If a 
defendant has deprived a plaintiff of $10,000, the legal system will require the defendant 
to pay $10,000 to the plaintiff. But the legal system has a great deal of difficulty in 
turning some welfare losses into monetary equivalents.  
 
A. Doctrine 
 
Suppose that Jones has lost the use of two toes, or that Smith has become blind, or 
that Wilson has been paralyzed from the waist down, or that Holmes has developed a 
high degree of post-trauma anxiety, or that Johnson has been subject to racial harassment, 
or that Benson has suffered a loss of cognitive capacity, or that Dickerson has become 
impotent. The legal system allows people to recover for “pain and suffering.” The 
adverse effects captured in the idea of pain and suffering are undoubtedly real, and the 
legal system should attempt to deter them and to provide compensation. Indeed, hedonic 
losses are often the most serious injuries that people face—far more serious than strictly 
economic losses. But the resulting damage awards are notoriously variable,2 and it is not 
clear that they are in any sense rational or coherent.3 An initial problem, which I will 
                                                 
2 David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. Rev. 256 
(1989). 
3 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or 
Capricious Awards?, 8 Intl Review of Law and Economics 203 (1988); Randall Bovbjerg et al., Valuing 
Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. L. Rev. 908 (1989); Gregory Rodgers, 
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explore below, is that the extreme difficulty of translating pain and suffering into 
monetary equivalents. 
In many states, people are also permitted to recover “hedonic damages,”  designed 
to capture people’s loss of enjoyment of their lives. The line between pain and suffering 
on the one hand and hedonic damages on the other can be obscure; events that impose 
suffering also impose hedonic losses. The basic distinction is that hedonic damages cover 
not affirmative distress or suffering but foregone gains, as when people are unable to 
engage in valued activities, such as athletics.4 Hedonic damages might be sought, for 
example, for the loss of a dog5; for the inability to engage in sexual relations6;  for the 
loss of a limb7; for the loss of use of an elbow8; for depression and self-consciousness as 
a result of amputation of an arm9; for reduced cognitive capacity or mental retardation10; 
or for becoming bedridden and thus requiring constant care.11 Here too, it is extremely 
difficult to translate the relevant interest into monetary equivalents. 
Even before the translation occurs, juries and judges investigating hedonic 
damages and pain and suffering are asked, in a sense, to serve as “hedometers,” assessing 
the adverse welfare effects associated with one or another loss. For purposes of analysis, I 
shall henceforth refer to both pain and suffering and hedonic damages as “hedonic 
losses,” while recognizing that the principles behind them are distinct. The idea of 
“hedonic” losses is meant to capture the utility or (subjective) welfare losses produced by 
some adverse event. I use the term “hedonic” to underline the connection with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Estimating Jury Compensation for Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases Involving Nonfatal 
Personal Injury, 6 J Forensic Economics 251 (1993). 
4 See Day v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So.2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (high school 
victim unable to play varsity sports for which he had been training since the sixth grade); Allen v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (award of hedonic damages for loss of ability to 
ride horse upheld) 
5 See, e.g., Campell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw 557, 632 P2d 1066 (Haw 1981) (allowing 
emotional damages for negligent death of dog); Knowles Animal Hosp. v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla Dist Ct 
App 1978) (same). 
6 See Varnell v. Louisiana Tech University, 709 So2d 890, 896 (La Ct App 1998). 
7 See Pierce v. NYCR Com., 409 F2d 1392 (Mich 1969); Matos v. Clarendon Nat Ins Co., 808 So2d 
841, 849 (La Ct App 2002). 
8 See Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 292 (Wash. 1987). 
9 See Coleman v. Deno, 832 So. 2d 1016 (La Ct App 2002). 
10 See Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567 (CD Ill 1988). 
11 See Edward P. Berla et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J 
Forensic Economics (1990). 
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emerging literature attempting to measure hedonic effects; the word “utility” would work 
equally well. 
Of course it is reasonable to ask about the theory on which the relevant judgments 
of judges and juries are supposed to be based. As the law now stands, the working theory 
is one of appropriate compensation or “making whole”—with the understanding that the 
compensatory award is supposed to restore plaintiffs to the hedonic state, or the level of 
welfare, that they would have occupied if the injury had not occurred.12 Under 
appropriate assumptions, the award of compensation, properly calculated, will also create 
the right deterrent signal, and hence accurate awards will promote social welfare as well. 
If those who are harmed seek and receive compensation, compensatory and deterrent 
goals should generally march hand-in-hand. As we shall see, however, the two goals 
often diverge—as when a monetary award for serious pain, or chronic headaches, does 
little or nothing to make the plaintiff “whole,” but does deter the kinds of acts that create 
serious pain or chronic headaches. 
 
B. Measurement 
 
How can judges and juries possibly serve as hedometers, lacking as they do direct 
access to people’s experience? On a standard economic approach, the legal system should 
start with willingness to pay (WTP).13 As we shall see, WTP might well reflect a hedonic 
forecasting error, in a way that complicates standard arguments for cost-benefit analysis 
as well as legal awards. But even if a forecasting error is not involved, there is no obvious 
way to ascertain the relevant amounts. Courts might ask: How much would people pay to 
reduce a risk of some injury? Suppose that Jones faces a 1/200,000 risk of losing his dog, 
of becoming impotent, or of being paralyzed from the waist down. How much would 
Jones pay to eliminate that risk? A method of this kind is used in the context of mortality 
risks, where the value of a statistical life (VSL) is ascertained by asking about monetary 
valuation as measured by reference to WTP.14 Either revealed preference or contingent 
valuation studies might be used for this purpose. 
                                                 
12 For discussion, see Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives in Pain and 
Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995). 
13 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998). 
14 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994). 
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But this approach is barred in tort cases,15 which ask not about valuation of risks, 
but instead about injuries after they occur. Technically, of course, the answer to the two 
questions might well turn out to be identical. If Jones would be willing to pay $10 to 
eliminate a 1/200,000 chance of losing his dog, the loss of his dog would seem to be 
worth $2 million. But this statement of equivalence raises many questions, at least if it is 
meant to capture actual behavior. Various cognition distortions might ensure that people 
would pay far less, or far more, than $10 to avoid a risk of 1/200,000, even if the ultimate 
loss would be worth $2 million. In any case it is far from clear that most people would 
produce a monetary figure, for a 1/200,000 risk of some injury, such as the loss of an 
arm, equal to 1/200,000 the amount that they would produce for a certainty of the same 
injury.  
To assess hedonic damages, courts might be inclined to ask: How much would 
people have to be paid to incur the relevant loss? The question might be how much 
people would demand to give up three fingers, or two toes, or sexual capacities, or the 
use of an arm. This question is often described as involving “willingness to accept,” or 
WTA.16 But the legal system bans courts from asking the WTA question, whether it is 
phrased in terms of WTA to face risks or WTA to face actual losses.17 There are two 
possible reasons, involving loss aversion and humiliation respectively. Both of these may 
mean that people’s WTA would be excessive if measured against the loss.  
It is well-established that people are highly averse to losses, in the sense that they 
will demand more to give up a good than they would be willing to pay to obtain that good 
in the first instance.18  By itself, this point does not establish that WTA is the wrong 
measure; perhaps people’s WTA more accurately captures the welfare loss than WTP.19 
But evidence suggests that loss aversion may well reflect a hedonic forecasting error: 
People greatly exaggerate the actual hedonic harms associated with a loss from the status 
quo.20 If this is so, then the WTA question is the wrong one; people’s answers will not 
                                                 
15 See Viscusi, Pain and Suffering, supra note. 
16 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw L Rev 1227 (2003). 
17 See Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives in Pain and Suffering 
Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995). 
18 See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1993). 
19 For a good discussion, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, supra note. 
20 See Deborah A Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error 17 Psychological 
Science 649 (2006). 
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map onto the actual harm once the loss comes to fruition. I shall emphasize this point 
throughout, because it raises the possibility that in many domains, people’s judgments 
about hedonic effects will be wrong. 
In addition, it would seem to be humiliating for people to acknowledge that for a 
certain amount, they would be willing to allow someone to take two of their toes.21 
Because they seek to avoid the humiliation, their answer to the question might greatly 
overstate the hedonic loss. Suppose that people were asked: How much would you have 
to be paid to accept some physical injury? Their response, including the humiliation 
involved in offering any answer at all, might be far higher than their hedonic loss. An 
obvious problem is the signaling effect of any affirmative answer; those who say that 
they are willing to trade their toes for money might be offering a damaging signal about 
their concern for their own integrity, bodily and otherwise. Hence people’s unwillingness 
to accept a monetary amount in return for some loss may not reflect the hedonic effect of 
the loss; the number may be inflated because of the signaling effect of acceptance. 
Perhaps the right question is instead: How much would people, having 
experienced the loss, need to be paid to feel adequately compensated for that loss? This 
question, one involving “making whole” as distinct from “selling price,” seems to capture 
the judgments actually made relevant by the legal system.22 But the “making whole” 
question raises its own puzzles. How much money would be necessary to make a person 
as well off as he would be if he had not been injured at all? Suppose that someone has 
lost a spouse or a child, or that he now faces chronic (and severe) headaches, or that his 
face has been permanently disfigured. What amount of money would restore the plaintiff 
to her pre-injury state? Or suppose that someone has lost two toes or been paralyzed from 
the waist down. When asked how much would make them whole, it is possible that 
people would sincerely say that they would have to be paid (say) $100,000 for the loss of 
two toes, or $5,000,000 to be compensated for paralysis. But perhaps those very people 
do not suffer such a large hedonic loss from the relevant conditions. Perhaps they are not 
greatly suffering, or not suffering at all, but would nonetheless claim (sincerely) that very 
                                                 
21 See Korobkin, supra note. 
22 See McCaffery et al., supra note. 
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high amounts are necessary to compensate them.23 (I will explore this puzzle in some 
detail below, because it raises serious doubts about the standard economic analysis in 
many domains of law and policy.) 
Both willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures therefore face serious 
problems. Those problems might be overcome if the legal system had direct access to 
people’s welfare. Armed with an actual hedometer, legal institutions might be able to 
make accurate measurements of the harmful effects of various losses. Those involved in 
law might be able to know, for example, whether the loss of two toes, or a pet, or serious 
disfigurement imposes a great deal of hedonic loss or not.24 The results of an accurate 
hedonic assessment would represent substantial progress; and a great deal of effort has 
been devoted toward making such progress.25 
 
III. Adverse Conditions and Hedonics 
 
A. Resilience and Hedonic Judgment Errors 
 
A major finding is that human beings are unexpectedly resilient. As a result, many 
apparently significant injuries do not inflict substantial long-term hedonic harms.26 
Perhaps above all, it is important to distinguish between those adverse conditions that 
impose large and persistent losses and those adverse conditions that impose only 
transitional, short-term, or modest losses, because of human resilience. For purposes of 
law and policy, a key point here is that people are often unable, in advance, to anticipate 
the hedonic effects of adverse events, and their inability on this count produces hedonic 
forecasting errors.27 Recall that for the moment, my concern is genuinely hedonic losses; 
as we shall see, it is possible that people will not suffer such losses, strictly speaking, but 
will nonetheless suffer losses of an important kind. 
                                                 
23 See D.M. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies: Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings 
Than Do Current Patients, Health Psychology (forthcoming).  
24 See, e.g., Washington v. Aetna, 886 So 2d 572 (La. 2004). 
25 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Happiness (2005); Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for 
Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, Science 1776 (2004); Peter Ubel 
and George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering: It’s Not (Just) About Pain and Suffering, J Legal Stud 
(forthcoming 2007).. 
26 Overviews can be found in Daniel Kahneman et al., Well-Being (2002); Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling 
on Happiness (20060. 
27 See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 75 J Pers Soc Psych 617 (1998). 
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Let us begin with the limited hedonic effects of many positive changes. Lottery 
winners are not happier, a year later, than other people are.28 Marriage is often thought to 
be associated with increases in happiness, but after a few years, married people are not 
happier than they were before.29 Apparently marriage produces a significant hedonic 
“boost,” but the boost is short-lived, and people return fairly quickly to their pre-marriage 
state. Increases in salary have a similar feature; a 20% increase is highly welcome, but 
after a short period, people do not show a significant long-term change in self-reported 
happiness or life satisfaction. 
With respect to many negative changes, including those that concern the legal 
system, the hedonic effects are often surprisingly small. It is remarkable but true that 
paraplegics are only modestly less happy than other people.30 Young people who have 
lost a limb as a result of cancer show no less happiness than similarly situated young 
people who have not had cancer.31 Moderately disabled people recover to their pre-
disability level after two years.32 Kidney dialysis patients do not show lower levels of 
happiness than ordinary people.33 Colostomy patients report levels of happiness that are 
about the same as people who have not had colostomies.34 (Intriguingly, those with 
colostomies greatly exaggerate their actual level of happiness before they had 
colostomies—while those with reversed colostomies report that before the reversal, they 
were far less happy than they were in fact.35 I will return to these findings below.)  
From this evidence, it is fair to conclude that healthy people systematically 
overestimate the adverse effects of many physical problems. Those who face such 
                                                 
28 Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer at 410-11. 
29 Compare Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis, and Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in 
Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, CNRS and DELTA-Federation Jourdan Working 
Paper No. 2003-14 (2003) and Richard Easterlin, Building a better theory of well-being, IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 742 (2003). 
30 Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 
20 J Econ Persp 3, 14 (2006). An interesting question, not explored in the hedonic literature, is the extent to 
which discrimination and stigma might contribute to the (admittedly modest) decrease in happiness, or 
perhaps in more significant decreases in moment-by-moment happiness.  
31 Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note. 
32 Andrew Oswald and Powdthavee Nattavudh, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of 
Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, Mimeo, University of Warwick (2005).   
33 See id. 
34 See Smith et al., supra note. 
35 See Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note. 
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problems experience unexpectedly little in the way of hedonic loss.36 To be sure, it is 
possible to question the relevant findings; social scientists do not yet have hedometers. 
But from the existing work, the basic conclusions follow whether we rely on global 
measures of happiness or life-satisfaction, which have been shown to have a high degree 
of external validity,37 or moment-by-moment measures of mood and happiness, which 
seem to be even more reliable.38 
In a less dramatic vein, assistant professors greatly overstate the effect of an 
adverse tenure decision on their subjective happiness.39 They expect that this decision 
will affect their happiness for many years, and in part for that reason, greatly want to be 
tenured. But after a few years have passed, those who were denied tenured show no less 
happiness than those who were tenured. Many voters believe that the outcome of an 
election will greatly affect their happiness a month after the election is held. But in that 
month, supporters of losing and winning candidates are as happy as they were before the 
election.40 People have been found to overestimate the welfare effects of personal insults, 
the outcomes of sports events, and romantic breakups; in all of these circumstances, the 
adverse effects, while real and for a time severe, are surprisingly small and short-term. 41  
 
B. Enduring vs. illusory Losses (or Loud Unpleasant Noises vs. Fewer Toes) 
 
To say this is not to deny that some advantageous events and conditions create 
large and enduring gains, and that some adverse events and conditions impose serious 
and persistent losses. Various drugs, such as Prozac, apparently create long-term boosts 
in subjective well-being. It is easy to imagine changes in the allocation of time—from, 
say, commuting and work to socializing, vacations, and leisure—that would produce 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 See Kahneman and Krueger, supra note. 
38 See Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note. For a good discussion of  the complex question whether the 
relevant scales are reliable, see George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of 
Decision and Experience Utility (unpublished manuscript 2006). For present purposes I am assuming that 
the scales are reliable, or reliable enough, in obtaining hedonic measures, while recognizing that the 
existing evidence, while highly suggestive, is not conclusive on that point. 
39 Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future 
Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking 186 (Joseph Forgas ed. 2000). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 353. 
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enduring benefits.42 Hence it is false to say that people’s resilience, and their capacity for 
adaptation, ensure that social changes and interventions are powerless to affect happiness 
or life-satisfaction.  The task is to ensure that any changes counteract persistent rather 
than illusory losses, or that they produce gains to which people will not quickly adapt. 
On the negative side, consider the instructive and in a sense defining example of 
loud, unpleasant noise, which people much dislike, and which they do not dislike less as 
time passes.43 With respect to highway noise, people show approximately the same level 
of irritation over a period of more than a year—and as time passes, they become more 
pessimistic, not less so, about their ability to adjust to the noise.44 The physiological 
effects of noise do not diminish in children over a significant period of time.45 A study of 
college students finds greater levels of annoyance at dormitory noise at the end of the 
year than at the beginning.46 Unpleasant noise reduces people’s enjoyment of their lives, 
and it continues to reduce their enjoyment for significant periods of time. We should 
conclude that tortuous behavior that causes (for example) loud ringing in the ears will 
impose very serious and quite long-term hedonic losses. 
Many adverse conditions belong in the same category as noise. Just as people 
overestimate the hedonic harm of many physical losses, such as kidney dialysis and 
colostomies, so too people underestimate the hedonic effect of adverse effects, such as 
depression and chronic pain.47 Leading sources of low levels of happiness include mental 
illness (such as anxiety and depression)48; subjectively reported bad health (above all, 
pain imposes severe and continuing hedonic losses)49; unemployment50; and separation 
from a spouse.51 The process of divorce is bad, but not as bad as separation; notably, 
                                                 
42 See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (2000). 
43 Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation 303, 311, in Well-Being (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds. 1998). 
44 Neil D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against Adaptation, 2 Journal of 
Environmental Psych. 87 (1982). 
45 Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note. 
46 Id. 
47 See Peter Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies Between 
Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 Quality of Life Research 599 (2003). 
48 Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Layard at 64.  
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people adjust fairly quickly and return to their pre-divorce state.52 More speculatively, we 
might suggest that some medical conditions produce significant and enduring losses to 
the extent that people do not stabilize but instead must anticipate medical results and 
consider, with some frequency, whether they are getting better or worse. Certain cancers, 
in which significant periods of time are spent expecting and receiving results, might well 
fall in the same category as noise. Also speculatively, we might suggest that some 
conditions impose significantly and enduring losses to the extent that they produce 
discrimination and stigma of the kind to which people do not easily adapt and on which 
they tend to focus. Serious facial disfigurement, for example, might produce enduring 
hedonic losses because of the social consequences of having a disfigured face. 
It is therefore important to distinguish among four phenomena: (1) gains that are 
significant and enduring, such as those produced by relief of chronic pain; (2) gains that 
are largely illusory, such as those produced by increases in salary; (3) losses that are 
significant and enduring, such as those produced by depression and anxiety; and (4) 
losses that turn out to be illusory (at least in the long term), such as those produced by 
loss of limbs or by colostomies. For purposes of the legal questions on which I am 
focusing here, the latter two phenomena are the most important.  
 
C. Failures of Affective Forecasting 
 
From these findings, we can draw two general conclusions. The first is that many 
apparently serious losses inflict relatively little in the way of long-term hedonic harm. 
The second is that people do not anticipate this fact; they expect far more harm than they 
actually experience. A key reason is that people neglect the power of psychological 
mechanisms that immunize them from the kinds of hedonic losses that they expect to face 
in the event that things go wrong. 
In many cases, people are subject to “immune neglect”; they do not see the power 
of their internal psychological immune system, which greatly diminishes the welfare 
effects of apparently significant changes. A related problem is that people demonstrate a 
                                                 
52 Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis, and Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in Life 
Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, CNRS and DELTA-Federation Jourdan Working Paper No. 
2003-14, 9 (2003).   
13 
kind of “impact bias,”53 in the form of a tendency to exaggerate the effect of future events 
on their own emotional states. The exaggerations are sometimes described as a 
consequence of “duration bias,”54 understood as a tendency to overestimate of the length 
of time during which undesirable effects will have an emotional impact. “The conclusion 
from this body of research is that people are systematically wrong in their expectations 
about the life circumstances that will increase or decrease their happiness, which in turn 
implies that life choices that people make in their pursuit of happiness are also likely to 
be wrong.”55  
The implication for the legal system is clear. If ordinary people make mistakes in 
forecasting the effects of adverse events in their own lives, there is every reason to think 
that juries (and judges) will make similar mistakes in assessing the effects of those events 
on plaintiffs, especially but not only when they are projecting future losses. Hedonic 
judgment errors are likely to affect those involved in the legal system as well as ordinary 
people in ordinary life. As we shall see, the same point applies to policymakers, including 
regulators. 
 
D. Adaptation, Attention, and Focusing Illusions 
 
Why, exactly, do adverse events often have relatively little effect on people’s 
subjective well-being? The general phenomenon is adaptation; an underlying 
mechanism, which might be defined as a distinct phenomenon, involves attention. When 
apparent losses inflict surprisingly little hedonic harm, it is often because people do not 
much focus on those losses after a period of transition.56 
A great deal of work explores the possibility of “adaptive preferences,” which 
arise as people adapt their preferences to the existing circumstances.57 Consider the tale 
of the fox and the sour grapes. Knowing that they are unavailable, the fox does not want 
                                                 
53 See Affective Forecasting, supra note, at 349. 
54 Id. at 230. 
55 Id. at 231. 
56 See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Structure of Well-Being in Two Cities (unpublished manuscript 
2007). But see Peter Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, 11 Journal of Exp Psych 111 (2005) (noting that 
adaptation is a distinctive phenomenon, not necessarily produced by attention, and finding that it is easier 
to get people to appreciate adaptation than to reduce focusing illusions). 
57 See, eg, Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983). 
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the grapes; his preference is a product of their unavailability, to which he has adapted.58 
The point might be counted as a challenge to utilitarianism: If people do not want 
opportunities or goods that are unavailable, is it so clear that the unavailability of those 
opportunities or goods can be defended by reference to people’s wants? Whether or not 
this question can be answered, it is clear that when people’s preferences have adapted to a 
social situation, their hedonic state will be much better than outsiders will anticipate.  
For an apparent real-world example, consider a study of self-reported health in 
India, a year after the Great Bengal Famine of 1943.59 Only 2.5 percent of widows said 
that they were “ill,” and none said that they were in “indifferent” health. By contrast, 45.6 
of widowers said that they were either ill or in indifferent health. The irony was that the 
widows were in significantly worse health than the widowers.60 Evidently the widows 
adapted to their situation, and generally believed that their health was good.  
Most generally, the term “hedonic adaptation” refers to the adjustment over time 
in the intensity of people’s emotional reactions to adverse events, in a way that ensures 
unexpectedly limited losses in terms of subjective happiness.61 The central factor here is 
that people’s affective responses to a bad event or condition typically abate as time 
passes.62 Those who have been denied tenure, or lost the use of a limb, or have had a 
colonoscopy, will react intensely at first, but after a year, their affective response will be 
much smaller. When moderately disabled people show little or no hedonic loss, 
adaptation, thus understood, is the key reason. 
A distinctive mechanism, which can also be taken as one explanation for the 
general phenomenon of adaptation, involves the operation of human attention.63 When 
people lose the use of an arm, they do not think, most of the time, about the fact that one 
of their arms does not work. Instead they focus on the central features of their hours and 
their days—their jobs, their meals, their relationships, the book they are reading or the 
television show they are watching. To the extent that significant losses do not produce 
hedonic damages, it is frequently because people’s attention is not directed, most of the 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 139 (1999). 
60 Id. 
61 See Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note, at 303. 
62 See Peter Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?, 12 Quality of Life Research 599 (2003). 
63 See Daniel Kahneman and Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility As A Standard of Policy Evaluation, 
32 Environmental and Research Economics 161 (2005). 
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time, to those losses. Daniel Kahneman describes the problem in a wonderful maxim, my 
epigraph here: “Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while you are 
thinking about it.”64  
A failure to focus on what has been lost helps to explain the absence of substantial 
hedonic effects from apparently large losses. Focusing illusions help in turn to account 
for people’s surprise at the absence of such effects. People are surprised because they 
focus specifically on the loss, and thus conclude that it has large hedonic effects, 
neglecting to see that those who have experienced the loss do not, most of the time, focus 
on it. For hedonic forecasting, the general point is that when asked to focus on a 
particular aspect of life or a particular ingredient in welfare, observers are likely to make 
serious blunders, simply because in life, people do not usually focus on any particular 
aspect or any particular ingredient. As we shall soon see, many of the puzzles in the 
social science literature on subjective well-being are best explained in this light.  
Consider a simple demonstration of a focusing illusion. Many people appear to 
believe that they are less happy than that would be if they lived in California.65 This 
belief is held both by people who live in California and people who do not live in 
California. But in fact, those who live in California are not happier than those who live 
elsewhere. Focusing on California weather in particular, Californians and Ohioans 
believe that they would be happier in California even though weather is not, in fact, an 
important determinant of most people’s happiness. Failures in affective forecasting are 
often a product of a focusing illusion: People focus on a particular loss, without seeing 
that after the loss has occurred, they are not likely to focus (much) on that loss.66 When 
“primed” to think about weather, or any other factor that is a small ingredient in the 
subjective well-being of most people (such as, for example, the ability to perform well in 
sports), focusing illusions lead people to give excessive attention to that factor.  
                                                 
64 Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler, Utility Maximization and Expected Utility, 20 J Econ Pesp 
221, 229 (2006). 
65 See David Schkade and Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy?, 9 Psych 
Science 340 (1998). 
66 Note, however, the failure to replicate the finding of a focusing illusion in Peter Ubel et al., 
Disability and Sunshine, 11 Journal of Exp Psych 111 (2005). 
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Contingent valuation studies run into an exceedingly serious problem for this 
reason.67 In such studies, people are specifically asked to value some good, event, or state 
of affairs (including modest improvements in climate). If the focusing illusion is at work, 
the resulting numbers will be unrealistically high. We could easily imagine such a study 
with respect to the loss of two toes, an arm, or a leg. If nothing in life matters quite as 
people think it does when they are thinking about it, then contingent valuation studies are 
likely to inflate the importance of certain goods, because they are explicitly designed to 
make people think about (the relevant) “it.” It should be easy to see that a similar 
problem might infect judges and juries, which are, by hypothesis, being focused on a 
particular loss.  
These points, and an understanding of attention in particular, help to explain why 
some conditions do in fact produce serious or enduring losses. Noise is the exemplar 
here; loud and unpleasant noises create such losses because it is hard not to focus on 
them. In the same vein, conditions that impose enduring losses command attention; 
people necessarily focus on them. It is hard, for example, not to attend to chronic pain. 
By definition, depression and anxiety cannot be put to one side. To the extent that social 
situations draw constant attention to a condition, people will attend to that condition. 
When people are separated from their spouses, they are focused, much of the time, on 
that fact. A few years afterwards, divorce becomes a background fact, not a source of 
constant attention. Parents whose children are suffering or needing constant attention, 
will experience serious hedonic losses; it is hard not to attend to the needs or distress of 
one’s children, and such distress can serve, for parents, as exceedingly loud noise (with 
remarkable amplifiers).   
Other puzzles in the hedonic literature can be similarly understood. Marriage 
produces a short-term burst in life satisfaction, because those who are recently married 
are thinking, much of the time, about their recent marriage. But after a few years, 
marriage becomes part of life’s furniture, and it ceases to create the hedonic boost—even 
if the union is entirely happy. 
We can now understand one of the most counterintuitive findings in the hedonic 
literature. The life satisfaction of many disabled people is not greatly lower than that of 
                                                 
67 See Valuing Environmental Preferences (Ian Bateman et al. eds 1997). 
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able-bodied people, and for some kinds of disabilities, life satisfaction is essentially the 
same. At the same time, many disabled people believe that they were happier before they 
were disabled, and there is clear evidence that they would pay a great deal to return to 
their pre-disability state.68 If the analysis here is correct, disabled people are themselves 
subject, or made subject, to a focusing illusion, when they are asked how their lives were  
(would be) different when they were (if they were) not disabled, or how much they would 
pay not to be disabled in terms of money or remaining years of life.69 I am not sure that 
this claim is correct; we do not have sufficient evidence to know for sure. But if the claim 
seems preposterous, consider the following question: “Would you be happier if the 
weather in your city—say, Chicago, Boston, New York, or Philadelphia—were 
automatically converted to the weather of Los Angeles or San Francisco?” You might 
well say yes. But you would be wrong. 
 
IV. Legal Implications 
 
A. Juries, Adaptation, and Attention 
 
For the legal system, there is a concrete implication. Juries and others are likely to 
make hedonic judgment errors, often exaggerating the hedonic effects of losses.70 The 
basic problem is that when asked to award damages for a certain loss, the attention of the 
jury (and the judge) is fixated on the loss in question. It is as if juries were asked: Would 
you be happier in California? Deliberately focused on a particular injury, juries are 
unlikely to see that most of the time, the plaintiff may not be much focused on the 
particular injury. The very circumstances of trial create the focusing illusion.71 In the 
legal system, juries and judges are asked specifically to think about the importance of the 
things that they are intensely thinking about. 
                                                 
68 See Adam Sahama, What Is The Social Model Good For? (unpublished manuscript 2007). 
69 It is possible, however, that disabled people are showing an implicit appreciation of the importance 
of capabilities, an issue that I take up below. 
70 An illuminating discussion, overlapping with the treatment here and focused on hedonic damages in 
particular, is Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, Virginia L Rev (forthcoming 2007). 
71 Admittedly, this is true for plaintiffs as well as for juries. Those who bring suit will likely focus on 
their injury – likely more so than  those who do not bring suit. On purely hedonic grounds, it might well 
make sense to discourage (some) plaintiffs from bringing suit, because litigation will prevent hedonic 
adaptation. To the extent that the suit focuses the plaintiff on the relevant condition, the problem I am 
describing – exaggerated damage awards – is reduced.  
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 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff has lost two fingers or an arm, and the jury 
is asked to monetize the loss, including the pain and suffering associated with it. Because 
of the power of the psychological immune system, it is not implausible to think that the 
loss is short-term and very small. After a period of adjustment and (admittedly nontrivial) 
transition costs, those who lose two fingers, or even an arm, may be only modestly worse 
off, in hedonic terms, than those who have suffered no such loss. In fact they might not 
be worse off at all; recall that there is no discernible hedonic difference between ordinary 
people and those who have lost a limb as a result of cancer.72  
Juries and judges are unlikely to understand this point. In all probability, they too 
will suffer from a focusing illusion, akin to those asked whether they would be happier if 
they lived in California. It is a sensible to think that in the award of damages, the legal 
system is likely to be showing a systematic bias as a result. And in fact, it is not difficult 
to find cases in which such a bias is exhibited, with substantial damage awards for 
adverse events that are unlikely to have inflicted serious hedonic losses.73 Consider, for 
example, a $1 million award for the loss of feeling and strength in a hand,74 or an award 
of $1.5 million for the amputation of a finger.75 
We might reach a similar conclusion for hedonic damages. If someone has lost a 
dog, he is likely to suffer and the legal system should aware compensation. But the 
suffering will not usually last a long time.76 Or suppose that someone has lost mobility, 
so that she can no longer ski or play tennis. If the question is how much that person has 
lost in terms of “enjoyment of life,” understood in hedonic terms, the answer is very 
plausibly: Little or nothing. 
It is both true and important that even if long-term harms are not likely, the short-
term harms might be severe. People might experience a degree of distress, fear, 
mourning, and grief for which a significant degree of compensation is justified. The only 
                                                 
72 See note supra. 
73 See, e.g., Dauria v. City of New York, 577 N.Y.S. 2d 64  (App. Div. 1991); Coleman v. Deno, 832 
So.2d 1016 (La Ct App 2002); Squibb v. Century Group., 824 So. 2d 861 (La Ct App 2002); Thornton v. 
Amtrak, 802 So 2d 816 (La Ct App 816); Keefe v. E & D Specialty Stands, Inc., 708 NYS 2d 214 (NY App 
Div 2000). 
74 See Keefe v. E & D Specialty Stands, Inc., 708 NYS 2d 214 (NY App Div 2000). 
75 Thornton v. Amtrak, 802 So 2d 816 (La Ct App 816) 
76 I put to one side the question whether the dog’s loss should be treated as a loss for the dog, not for 
human beings; I would answer that question affirmatively. 
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point is that juries are likely to exaggerate the long-term effects and to that extent to 
award excessive damage awards. If short-harm harms are severe, they should be 
recognized and compensated as such. 
The existence of hedonic forecasting errors also suggests the possibility that juries 
are awarding insufficiently large sums in cases in which the hedonic loss is likely to be 
high. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff is suffering chronic back pain. The pain may 
be relatively low-level, but it might be persistent. It is not difficult to find cases in which 
juries award low damage awards in such instances.77 Consider, for example, a $4000 
award for an accident producing headaches three to four times per week and persistent 
pain in hands, knees, and shoulders78; a $25,000 award to nineteen-year-old woman 
whose accident causes a painful hip deformity, headaches, ringing in ears, permanent 
arthritis in hip, and backaches79; an award of $47,000 for accident causing herniation in 
the lower back, accompanied by permanent radiating pain and restriction80; or an award 
of $30,000 for permanent pain in the neck and knee from herniated cervical disc and torn 
meniscus.81 In all these cases, the award seems far too low, because the relevant injury 
was likely to be enduring. 
In the abstract, low-level back pain, headaches, ringing in the ears, and pain in the 
neck and knee may not seem especially serious; these are familiar phenomena, unlike loss 
of a limb. But to the extent that such conditions are severe, they are likely to operate in 
the same way as noise: as problem that do not much improve over time. People might 
well undervalue such injuries with the thought that back pain, headaches, and ringing in 
the ears are ordinary parts of human experience—unlike, say, the loss of toes. But those 
who face chronic pain, severe headaches, or loud ringing in the ears suffer massive 
hedonic losses, and jurors are unlikely to appreciate that fact.  
It is possible of course that some juries and judges might distrust claims of back 
pain, and to be discounting the award because of the risk of faking. But even if those 
involved in the legal system do believe the claims, they will probably underestimate the 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Levy v. Bayou Indus. Maint Serv., 855 So 2d 968, 980 (La Ct App 2003) (award of 
$50,000 for post-concussion syndrome, including vertigo and migraine headaches). 
78 Hatcher v. Ramada Plaza Hotel & Conf. Ctr., 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 255 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2003): 
79 Frankel v. Todd, 260 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
80 Ledesma v. Long Island Railroad, 1997 WL 33346870 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
81 Russo v. Jordan, 2001 NY Slip Op 40062U, 9 (N.Y. Misc. 2001). 
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adverse effects of certain losses over time. Imagine, for example, what it means to be 
subject to loud ringing in the ears or to persistent headaches. The same points apply to 
cases in which tortuous behavior produces depression or anxiety. In such cases, the 
hedonic injury is very serious, and significant damage awards are justified.82 Juries and 
judges might well fail to see this point. 
 
B. Capability Damages 
 
 If the discussion thus far is correct, awards for pain and suffering, and for hedonic 
damages, are often inflated from the hedonic point of view. But does this mean that they 
are inflated from the correct point of view? The very ideas of “pain and suffering” and 
“hedonic damages” suggest attention to subjective mental states. But it is possible that 
subjective mental states are not all that matter, and that the legal system is attentive to 
that fact. Let us now shift gears, moving from a purely Benthamite perspective, focused 
only on subjective mental states, to an Aristotelian one, focused on what people are able 
to do and to be. 
Loss of capabilities. Suppose that Jones loses the use of a leg; suppose too that the 
loss does not affect that Jones’ self-reported happiness. After a difficult but short period 
of adjustment, Jones is as happy as he was before the loss. Suppose too that the effort to 
measure Jones’ moment-by-moment happiness finds that he is no less happy than he was 
before.83 In other words, Jones has experienced no hedonic loss. Should the legal system 
therefore disregard Jones’ injury?  
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Hall v. Brookshire Bros., Ltd., 831 So. 2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (general damages 
award of $1.5 million was not excessive where injuries significantly compromised plaintiff’s mobility and 
stability, resulting in “chronic problems with dizziness, vertigo, and nausea” and psychological symptoms 
such as depression and sexual dysfunction, and “hamper[ing] her ability to travel with her husband and to 
spend quality time with her two children and four granddaughters, as she once did”); Levy v. Bayou Indus. 
Maint. Servs., 855 So. 2d 968, 980 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding loss of enjoyment of life award of 
$50,000 where plaintiff suffered post-concussion syndrome, including vertigo and migraine headaches, and 
trial court based award on “plaintiff’s inability to continue to roller skate, difficulty in flying in airplanes, 
difficulty in having (and enjoying) sexual relations with her husband, inability to accomplish her goal of 
becoming a licensed professional counselor, and loss of independence and ability to maintain the high level 
of activity she enjoyed prior to the accident). 
83 See Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day 
Reconstruction Method, Science 1776 (2004). 
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What Jones has lost is a capability.84 He cannot walk on his leg; he certainly is 
unable to run. He is unable to engage in many activities that he used to be able to take for 
granted. Jones may not be in pain and he may not be suffering. Jones may not be 
suffering hedonic damage in the sense that no hedometer can show that Jones enjoys his 
life less than he did before. Might the legal system nonetheless award damages? If the 
answer is yes, it is not justified by a hedonic loss. Instead the loss involves a capability. 
That loss may be real and significant, even if hedonic measures are unable to capture it. 
Consider, as apparently supporting evidence, the fact that most people would be willing 
to pay significant amounts to avoid a loss of a capability, even if they could be persuaded 
that the loss would inflict no hedonic harm.85 
The claim on behalf of capability losses is a normative one, based on the objective 
harm faced by those who lose physical or cognitive abilities. If people have had 
colostomies or if they are on dialysis machines, they have suffered a significant loss 
whatever their hedonic state. Consider here two remarkable findings. As we have seen, 
people with colostomies do not show less happiness than people without colostomies; but 
at the same time, they say that they would give up to 15% of their lives to be able to live 
without a colostomy.86  Similarly, dialysis patients show little adverse hedonic effect, but 
many of them say that they would willingly yield over half their remaining years in order 
to have normal kidney function87! These answers seem to suggest a concern for 
capabilities, not merely for hedonic states. 
2. Hedonic judgment errors or recognition of capabilities? In invoking this 
evidence, I do not mean to suggest that people’s statements on such points should be 
                                                 
84 Cf. Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985): Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach (2002); Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (1999). I am not 
using the idea of “capabilities” in the same sense as Sen and Nussbaum, but my use belongs in the same 
general family, focusing as it does on the capacity to function, rather than subjective mental states. 
85 It is important to see, of course, that whether someone has lost a capability depends on how social 
institutions react to the relevant losses. If someone has lost the use of a foot, perhaps he is able to use a 
prosthetic foot, and perhaps the prosthetic foot can function quite well. The same might be true for legs. 
And even if people are using wheelchairs, the capability loss produced by wheelchair use is a product of 
how social institutions accommodate people on wheelchairs. One way to understand the Americans with 
Disabilities Act is to see it as an effort to reduce the risk that impairments will turn into capability losses. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that many injuries produce significant and long-term losses of that kind even if 
no long-term hedonic harm is experienced. 
86 See George Loewenstein and Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and 
Experience Utility in Public Policy (unpublished manuscript 2007). 
87 Id. 
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taken as authoritative.88 Begin with the case of healthy people. If such people are 
horrified at the prospect of having a colostomy, and if they cannot bear the thought of 
being on a dialysis machine, they might well believe, quite falsely, that the relevant 
change would make life barely livable. Hedonic judgment errors of this kind might well 
be impervious to debiasing. It is imaginable, for example, that people would be willing to 
demand a great deal to lose a leg, even if they could be given a fully adequate prosthetic 
(perhaps better than the original) and even if they could be given reliable evidence that 
they would suffer no hedonic loss after a (brief) period of transition. People’s conclusions 
about what they would pay to avoid or to eliminate a loss might well reflect a hedonic 
judgment error, or a heuristic that is productive of blunders, and if so those conclusions 
should not be taken as a basis for policy. If a hedonic judgment error is at work, people 
are not, in fact, showing an appreciation of capability losses. 
The judgments of those who have actually suffered such losses would seem to be 
entitled to more weight. Because colostomy or dialysis patients would give up significant 
amounts of their lives to be well, we do appear to have reason to think that they are 
(recognizing that they are) suffering a real loss whatever their hedonic states. Compare a 
person who has lost cognitive capacities; such a person may believe that they have 
suffered a real loss even if their hedonic state is good. But it is possible that colostomy or 
dialysis patients too are vulnerable to focusing illusions, no less than those in Chicago or 
Cleveland who might be willing to give up a great deal to have the weather enjoyed by 
people in Los Angeles. Recall that colostomy patients report wildly and inaccurately high 
levels of happiness before they had colostomies, and that people whose colostomies have 
been reversed say that they were far less happy than they were in fact.89 
In short, I am not claiming that when people say that they want to avoid 
conditions that do not impose hedonic losses, they are actually motivated by a recognition 
of capability losses; a hedonic judgment error may well be responsible.90 My only claim 
is that when people have lost a capability, they have lost something significant from the 
normative point of view, even if they have suffered no hedonic loss.  
                                                 
88 This seems to me the tendency in Loewenstein and Ubel, supra note. 
89 See note supra. 
90 Compare Loewenstein and Ubel, supra note, which appears to honor people’s judgments even 
though they might well be based on cognitive errors. 
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3. Law and well-being. For those who believe that the legal system should accept 
this view, two difficult questions remain. First: What kinds of capability losses are 
legally cognizable? Second: How can capabilities be translated into monetary 
equivalents? At first glance, a notion of normal human functioning would seem to 
provide the baseline from which to measure capability loss.91 It would follow that if 
someone has lost the use of a leg or an arm, or of cognitive or sexual abilities, a 
capability loss is involved. I will return below to the question of monetization. 
 Recognition of the importance of capabilities has broader importance for thinking 
about well-being, whether it is measured in terms of self-reports involving global life 
satisfaction92 or in terms of moment-by-moment measures, designed to capture daily 
experience.93 Those who are able to run, or to have sexual experiences, are better off than 
those who lack these capabilities, even if the difference cannot be measured in hedonic 
terms. Those who are poorly educated have less in the way of capability than those who 
are well educated, even if hedonic measures cannot pick up a difference between the two 
groups. It is possible that people with less education do not show more negative affect or 
less positive affect, during their days, than people with a great deal of education,94 but 
education as such contributes to a richer life. Even if well-educated people do not seem 
happier according to a hedometer, their enjoyments are more numerous and qualitatively 
distinct; for good Millian reasons, taken up below, education is valuable whatever its 
effects on utility, narrowly conceived.  
An emphasis on subjective measures is important, because subjective experience 
matters a great deal. But purely hedonic accounts, focused solely on people’s moods, 
miss aspects of well-being to which sensible societies and legal systems are attuned. It is 
easy to imagine a group of people who score well on some hedonic measure—perhaps 
they are all generally at “6,” on a scale of 0-8, in terms of positive affect during their 
days—whose lives are not very good, even in terms of their own considered judgments. 
 
                                                 
91 For discussion, see Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of Normal Species 
Functioning in Disability Analysis, 6 Yale Health Policy, Law, and Ethics 221 (2006). 
92 See Frank, supra note. 
93 See Kahneman et al., supra note. 
94 Cf. id. 
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In a variety of cases, supposedly hedonic damages are probably best justified as 
capability damages. For example, courts have awarded hedonic damages for loss of the 
ability to engage in sports.95 Hedonic damages have been awarded for the loss of the 
senses of taste and smell.96  Courts have also awarded significant hedonic damages for 
the loss of a limb, in a way that may reflect a capability loss rather than a hedonic 
forecasting error.97 Hedonic damages have been awarded where the tort victim could no 
longer engage in sexual activities as a result of the injury.98 Or consider a case in which 
the injury rendered the plaintiff mentally retarded; the court awarded hedonic damages 
for the plaintiff’s loss of ability to, among other things, go on a first date, parent children, 
read, and debate the politics of the day.99 It is possible that the court believed that the 
plaintiff was less happy in some subjective sense. If so, the court might well have been 
wrong. But the plaintiff lost a capability, indeed a set of capabilities, and might be taken 
to have deserved damages for that reason.  
Consider the possibility that many people who have suffered significant 
neurological damage are not less happy than they were before; there is no reason to 
believe that people with Down’s Syndrome are unhappy and they may in fact be 
unusually happy. Does it follow that damage awards should be low, or zero, for tortuous 
behavior that has produced certain neurological damage, or Down’s Syndrome in infants? 
If loss of capabilities matter, significant damage awards would be justified even without 
an effect on subjective well-being. 
4. Normative issues. The idea of capability damages will be puzzling to those with 
strongly Benthamite inclinations, who think that such well-being is all that matters. And 
                                                 
95 See Day v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So.2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (high school 
victim unable to play varsity sports for which he had been training since the sixth grade); Allen v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (award of hedonic damages for loss of ability to 
ride horse upheld). 
96 See Daugherty v. Erie R. Co., 169 A.2d 549 (Pa. Sup. Ct.).  However, where the plaintiff lost hearing 
in one ear, a jury awarded no hedonic damages.  See Viviano v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 920 So.2d 313, 
316 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
97 See Pierce v. New York C. R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392 (Mich. 1969); Matos v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 
808 So.2d 841, 849 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that “a jury could award pain and suffering for the loss of a 
leg, the mental anguish one suffers from losing a limb, lost earnings if the loss affected his job, [and] loss 
of enjoyment of life . . . simply for the fact that the leg is gone and he is now disabled.”). 
98 See Varnell v. Louisiana Tech University, 709 So.2d 890, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (hedonic damages 
award upheld where plaintiff could not have sexual relations with her husband, engage in outdoor activities, 
play with her youngest daughter, or participate in school functions). 
99 See Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567 (C.D. Ill. 1988). 
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it is true that the term “hedonic damages” has an unmistakably Benthamite ring; if it is 
using a nonhedonic measure, the legal system is relying on a theory of harm that is not 
captured by the law’s own rubric. My principal suggestion is that many cases that award 
such damages are best justified on the ground that they reflect an implicit commitment to 
the importance of capabilities.100 People receive monetary compensation not because they 
enjoy their lives less, but because they have lost a capability. A key question, which a 
reading of the cases cannot answer, is whether the decisions are animated by some kind 
of hedonic judgment error or instead an intuitive but sensible judgment about capabilities. 
The normative issues are complex and I can offer only a few brief remarks here. 
Suppose that Jones has been severely injured and suffers a serious loss in cognitive 
capacities. Suppose too that the pain and suffering have been modest and that there is 
little or no loss in subjective well-being. Should Jones receive capability damages? Under 
the official theory of hedonic damages, the question is whether Jones has suffered a 
diminution in his “enjoyment of life.” If that idea is understood is purely hedonic terms, 
there is a real doubt whether damages should available; perhaps the relevant hedometers 
are unable to pick up any loss. But it is plausible to think that Jones has lost some 
“enjoyment of life” whatever the (relevant) hedometers say. Jones is now unable to have 
certain kinds of enjoyments that are available only to those who operate at particular 
cognitive level. The loss of (the capacity for) those enjoyments ought to matter.  
For some of the cases, John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher and lower 
pleasures is clearly relevant.101 Thus Mill writes, “it is an unquestionable fact that those 
who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, 
do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher 
faculties. . . . [No] intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed 
person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and 
base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better 
satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.”102 When hedonic damages are awarded 
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for the loss of cognitive capacities, judges and juries might well be responding to a logic 
of this kind. 
If it is correct to emphasize the importance of capabilities, the general argument 
applies to a wide range of losses, including those that do not involve higher-level 
cognitive functions. If Jones is unable to engage in sexual relationships, or to participate 
in certain athletic activities, it is plausible to say that his “enjoyment of life” has been 
impaired, once the right content has been given to that concept. It is true, however, that 
use of the idea of capability makes less sense for those losses that are essentially hedonic. 
If a person was once able to play tennis, but no longer can, is there a genuine loss if no 
hedometer can identify it? The answer to that question may be “no” even if we are 
confident that those with serious cognitive impairments, however happy, have lost some 
of the enjoyment of life. Perhaps the answer is “yes,” because  the person has lost an 
option, and because the option has value. I will return to this issue shortly. 
 
C. Translating (Hedonic and Capability) Losses into Money  
 
 Suppose that Jones has suffered a loss of a leg and that the loss produces a stated 
hedonic injury. We might agree that the loss is less serious than the loss of both legs, but 
more serious than the loss of three toes. What is the monetary value of the loss? Perhaps 
the same method can be used to answer that question regardless of whether we are 
investigating hedonic losses or capability losses. 
1. Willingness to pay? If we were speaking in economic terms, we might ask how 
much Jones would be willing to pay to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing the loss of a 
leg. As we have seen, this is a standard approach in the valuation of mortality and 
morbidity risks. Suppose that the focus is on Jones’ hedonic loss. If so, the discussion 
thus far should be enough to show that Jones’ willingness to pay may reflect a hedonic 
forecasting error. Perhaps Jones would be willing to pay $50 to avoid that risk, implying 
a loss of $5 million, even though the hedonic loss from a lost leg would not be terribly 
serious. Recall that loss aversion itself appears to be a hedonic forecasting error.103  
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Alternatively, suppose that the focus is on Jones’ capability loss. Perhaps Jones is 
concerned that the loss of a leg is a loss of a capability. He might want to pay a certain 
amount to preserve the “option value” of having his leg; or he might want to pay that 
amount of preserve the capability as such. In principle, his willingness to pay might be a 
good measure of the relevant value. But it is hard to imagine that faced with small 
probabilities of such losses, people can generate figures that reliably capture the 
capability values of significant harms, especially in view of the difficulty of measuring 
the actual effects of such losses before they have occurred. 
 If the goal of compensation is to restore people to the status quo, then people’s 
willingness to pay, before the fact, is an unreliable measure. In fact it may be a mistake to 
rely on people’s judgment about necessary compensation even after they are injured. Of 
course their judgment is least reliable in the period immediately following the injury. At 
that point, their focus on the injury and its removal may reflect a focusing illusion, no less 
than when people are asked about the weather.  And long after the injury has occurred, a 
focusing illusion might also distort their judgments, whether we are speaking in hedonic 
terms or in terms of capabilities. Recall that colostomy and dialysis patients would pay a 
great deal (in terms of remaining years of life!) to be well, even though available 
measures suggest that they are no less happy than they were before. 
 2. Scaling without a modulus. Loosened from willingness to pay, however, jurors 
are likely to produce highly unpredictable results. Indeed, the problem of translating 
hedonic or capability harms into monetary equivalents is a large source of inequality and 
variability in the legal system.  Studies of pain and suffering awards show a great deal of 
“noise,” in the form of variations unexplained by differences in the cases.104 The same is 
true of awards for sexual harassment.105 Experimental work suggests that some of the 
unpredictability comes from the fact that when translating injuries into dollars, jurors are 
being asked to “scale without a modulus”—that is, to assign monetary values along an 
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unbounded numerical scale without being given a modulus, or standard, by which to 
establish a meaning for the various points on the scale.106  
Imagine, for example, that people are asked to offer a numerical equivalent for the 
brightness of a light, or the loudness of a noise, on a bounded scale of 0 to infinity. There 
is every reason to believe that their judgments would have a high degree of 
unpredictability—not because of disagreement on anything substantial, but because of the 
nature of the scale. This problem certainly infects awards for pain and suffering: What is 
the monetary equivalent of three months with migraine headaches, or six months of 
rehabilitation of a broken leg, or back pain for the next twenty years? The same is true for  
hedonic damages, for jurors are not giving a modulus by which to decide on the 
economic value of some loss of the enjoyment of life.  What is the monetary equivalent 
of the loss of a dog, a limb, cognitive functioning, or sexual capacities? 
The translation of hedonic or capability losses into monetary equivalents raises 
daunting problems. But at the very least, it would be valuable to be able to know what is 
lost in welfare terms, before any attempt is made at translation. My minimal suggestion 
here has been that judges and juries are likely to make serious blunders in answering the 
welfare question. 
D. Toward Civil Damages Guidelines 
 
We can now identify two serious problems in the current situation. First (and this 
is the more established problem), juries and judges are likely to have difficulty in 
generating monetary figures to reflect pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. 
Second (and this is the problem uncovered by the happiness literature), juries and judges 
are likely to make hedonic judgment errors. My emphasis has been on the second 
problem, but if we take the two together, we will be inclined to consider large-scale 
reforms. Proceeding from scratch, no sensible person could possibly want to produce 
damage awards by asking ordinary people, with little guidance, to assign monetary 
amounts to losses with which they are unlikely to have had much experience.  
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The most obvious response would be a set of Civil Damages Guidelines, charged 
with the task of rationalizing the current situation. The guidelines would place heavy 
reliance on existing knowledge about hedonic harms, so as to avoid the risk of high 
awards for illusory losses and low awards for such harms as chronic pain, migraines, 
anxiety, and depression. To the extent that the short-term hedonic losses are present even 
when long-term adaptation occurs, the guidelines would take that point into account. To 
the extent that discrimination and stigma play a role in producing hedonic or other harm, 
the guidelines would consider that point as well.107 A significant part of the harm of 
certain injuries consists of the resulting social stigma, on which it might be difficult not 
to focus and from which both economic and noneconomic injuries may follow. Those 
injuries deserve to count.108  Moreover, a large advantage of the guidelines is that they 
would make it less necessary, and perhaps even unnecessary, for disabled plantiffs to 
“perform” their disability or their suffering in court, in a way that could be embarrassing 
and even humiliating. 
The guidelines would also attempt to make sensible translations into monetary 
equivalents, perhaps by drawing workers’ compensation awards, which reflect a similar 
attempt at rationalization. WTP figures would provide at least a start here; perhaps the 
best approach would begin with WTP for hedonic and capability losses and make 
suitable adjustments when WTP depends on a demonstrable error. Finally, the guidelines 
would make judgments about capability damages, clearly distinguishing them from 
hedonic harms.  
The development of such guidelines would have a significant technocratic 
dimension. The goal would not be to build on ordinary intuitions, which are unreliable. It 
would instead be to incorporate what has been learned about the actual effects of various 
losses. To the extent that the legal system is concerned with the consequences for 
subjective well-being, the distinction between persistent and illusory losses would play a 
key role. A great deal of attention would have to be paid to ranking capability losses and 
turning them into monetary equivalents. If such guidelines were in place, the role of 
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judges and juries would be limited and analogous to that of judges under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
E. Broader Lessons 
 
These remarks bear on much larger questions. In this section, I offer some notes 
on the relationship between happiness on the one hand and willingness to pay and income 
growth on the other. 
1. Willingness to pay and happiness. As I have suggested, many economists and 
economically oriented lawyers work with the WTP criterion. If people are willing to pay 
$50 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing a foot, there is a good argument that 
government should start with that number in deciding on appropriate policies. Suppose, 
however, that people’s WTP is a product of a systematic bias, perhaps in the form of a 
focusing illusion. If so, the connection between WTP and welfare effects will be 
weakened and possibly very weak. And if this is so, there are serious problems with 
reliance on WTP, because it operates as a crude proxy for welfare effects. In short, 
hedonic forecasting errors raise serious problems for standard ways of conducting cost-
benefit analysis. 
We can see the point most clearly in connection with contingent valuation studies. 
Suppose that people are asked: How much would you be willing to pay to ensure that 
climate in your city does not increase by a certain amount by a certain date, or to avoid a 
1/100,000 chance of losing a finger? The problem is that such questions specifically 
focus people on a certain loss and for that reason create a grave risk of a focusing 
illusion.109 To the extent that contingent valuation studies elicit WTP, there is a serious 
problem.  
Perhaps markets will reduce the problem, because the budget constraint, and the 
full menu of possible expenditures, looms much larger in the market domain than in the 
circumstances of surveys. Perhaps in their daily lives, people will not suffer serious 
focusing illusions when deciding how much to pay to reduce risks, because they are alert, 
at the relevant times, to the opportunity costs of the expenditures. Nonetheless, sellers of 
products would very much like to generate focusing illusions in order to ensure that 
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people will buy their products. And it is entirely possible that even in the market domain, 
WTP reflects a systematic distortion with respect to losses that seem to be significant (but 
are not) and with respect to losses that seem to be relatively trivial (but are large). A great 
deal of work remains to be done on this problem, which seems to unsettle many of the 
standard claims and views in economic analysis of policy and law.110 
2. Income growth, happiness, and capability. One of the most striking findings in 
modern social science is that increases in economic growth are not correlated with 
increases in measures of happiness or reported life-satisfaction.111 The United States, 
France, and Japan all experienced dramatic increases in real income in the 20th century, 
but showed no increase in subjective well-being.112 An especially striking finding 
involves China.113 Between 1994 and 2005, China experienced explosive growth in 
average real income—250 percent in fact. In that same period, life satisfaction has 
actually declined, with a reduction in reported “satisfaction” from 80 percent to 70 
percent, and an increase in reported “dissatisfaction” from 21 percent to 35 percent.114  
For purposes of self-reported happiness according to global measures, what 
appears to matter is relative economic position, not absolute economic position.115 
People’s self-reported happiness, by global measures, is greatly affected by their position 
in the economic hierarchy rather than by their absolute wealth. Apparently those who are 
in a high position, in a relevant hierarchy, impose “positional externalities” on others, 
causing hedonic damage.116 By contrast, significant shifts in absolute economic position 
produce little or no hedonic change.  From existing evidence, it is odd but not implausible 
to say that if GDP of America or France doubled in some period of years, we would not 
pick up any increase in people’s life-satisfaction. (Return to the case of China.) This 
conclusion seems counterintuitive but on reflection may not be: Do we really believe that 
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people now living are much happier than people who lived (say) five decades earlier, and 
that those who lived five decades earlier were happier than those who preceded them? 
Even when GDP grows every decade, does subjective well-being grow correspondingly? 
The problem, for those who believe that subjective well-being is our lodestar, is that 
existing evidence suggests that economic growth is not a good way to increase national 
well-being.  
Some people believe that what matters is not global measures of happiness, but 
measures of moment-by-moment happiness. Perhaps global measures are a crude way of 
capturing what really matters, which is happiness as it is actually experienced.117 But 
even if this is so, absolute income is a poor measure of moment-by-moment happiness; 
across a certain threshold, there is no evidence that wealth is correlated with positive 
affect or with an absence of negative affect.118 Even relative economic position, though 
correlated with global measures, is not correlated with measure of moment-by-moment 
happiness.119 We might therefore conclude that whether global or moment-by-moment 
measures are the appropriate guide, economic growth does not much matter to people’s 
welfare. 
But there is an important qualification. From the discussion thus far, it should be 
clear that self-reported happiness is not the only thing that is important, even if welfare, 
properly understood, is our lodestar. Happiness may not increase with growth in GDP, 
but one result of GDP growth may well be increases in longevity, health, and 
opportunity.120 From the standpoint of increasing human welfare, it is good to enable 
people to live eighty healthy years than forty less healthy years, even if their level of 
daily happiness does not increase. If increases in GDP are correlated with longer and 
healthier lives, and with better opportunities and greater education, such increases appear 
to promote welfare even if subjective happiness stays constant. Recall here the view that 
capabilities have independent importance. To the extent that increases in GDP increase 
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literacy, promote health, and ensure greater opportunity, they are valuable whatever 
happens to subjective happiness.  
This point receives indirect support from some intriguing differences between 
measures of global life satisfaction and measures of moment-by-moment happiness. 
Remarkably, it turns out that the two are only weakly correlated.121 For example, global 
life satisfaction is positively affected by whether one is married, has children, or is 
wealthy—but moment-by-moment happiness is not. (In fact divorced women report both 
lower life-satisfaction and higher moment-by-moment happiness than married 
women.122) It is tempting to think that the moment-by-moment measures are more 
accurate, because they are more reliable than global measures, which seem to be a stab in 
the dark. Consider the fact that experimenters can easily “prime” those who answer 
general questions about “happiness” or “life satisfaction,” for example by asking them 
first how many dates they have had in the past month.123 Such questions significantly 
affect reported life-satisfaction. Perhaps those who are not specifically primed engage in 
a kind of self-priming, asking certain questions (am I married, do I have children, or am I 
wealthy?) in a way that produces inaccurate measures of how happy they are in fact. On 
this view, moment-by-moment measures are far better; if people are saddened by asking 
questions about their global life-satisfaction, their sadness should matter only to the 
extent that it shows up in their actual experience.  
On a different view, however, global measures produce not inaccurate proxies, 
but more reflective judgments, in which people assess how well their lives are actually 
going. It is easy to imagine somewhat negative answers to that question despite high 
levels of moment-by-moment happiness, produced by hedonically good lives in which 
people see friends a great deal, have long vacations, and greatly enjoy their days. Such 
people might nonetheless conclude that their lives are not particularly satisfying, perhaps 
because they lack depth or meaning. Similarly, it is easy to imagine highly positive 
reactions to global life-satisfaction questions despite not-high levels of moment-by-
moment happiness. The high levels of life satisfaction and the not-high levels of moment-
                                                 
121 See Kahneman et al., supra note. 
122 See id. 
123 See Kahneman and Kruger, supra note.  
34 
by-moment happiness might be produced by lives in which people work hard, serve 
others, and have a great deal of stress. 
 I am not insisting that in fact, most people are giving reflective answers to 
questions about global life satisfaction, offering a mixture of judgments about their 
moods, their capabilities, and their assignments of meaning. What is clear is that even if 
social gains along various dimensions do not register either on global or moment-by-
moment measures, they should nonetheless count as gains; consider a population that is 
better educated, significantly healthier, and given more options about what to do with 
their lives. If economic growth produces those gains, it is valuable even if it does not 
have significant hedonic effects. 
But if the goal really is welfare, we might pursue the relevant ends directly, and 
focus on economic growth only to the extent that it is responsible or a good proxy for the 
relevant improvements. If the evidence on subjective happiness is taken seriously, the 
consequences for law and policy would appear to be significant, because economic 
growth would be demoted to a secondary matter, to be promoted only to the extent that it 
helps achieve primary goals, which might in any case be pursued directly.124 
 
Conclusion 
 
In many contexts, the legal system requires people to make difficult hedonic 
judgments. If people make serious hedonic judgment errors in their own lives, it is highly 
likely that juries and judges will make equivalent errors. In particular, there is a serious 
risk that adjudicative institutions will significantly overestimate the hedonic losses 
associated with certain injuries. The exaggerations stem in part from a failure to 
appreciate people’s powers of adaptation; they also stem, more specifically, from the kind 
of focusing illusion that people demonstrate when thinking about the effects of weather. 
Often apparently significant losses turn out to be illusory, at least if they are understood 
in hedonic terms. 
There are two particular implications. The first is that those involved in awarding 
damages must clearly distinguish between those injuries that involve persistent harm and 
those injuries that do not. Some injuries fall within the same category as unpleasant 
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noises, on which people cannot help but focus; other injuries, such as the loss of toes, 
inflict little hedonic harm. The second implication is that “capability damages” deserve 
independent analysis. Even if little or no hedonic loss is suffered, it is reasonable to 
conclude that people deserve to be compensated in the event of a loss or serious injury to 
capabilities.  
I have suggested that the legal system now suffers from serious problems in 
making hedonic judgments and in translating hedonic and capability losses into monetary 
equivalents. The natural response is a set of Civil Damages Guidelines, incorporating 
sensible assessments of monetization, the best available information about hedonic 
effects, and reflective judgments about capability losses. 
It should be clear that these points have implications for how policymakers might 
think about a range of questions outside of the domain of adjudication. These include the 
limits of the willingness to pay criterion, the value of national income growth, and 
appropriate priority-setting for governments concerned to improve social well-being. The 
minimal conclusion is that if hedonic states matter, governments should give far higher 
priority than they now do to the relief of mental illness and chronic pain.125 More 
generally, it would not be surprising if governments make significant hedonic judgment 
errors in fiscal and regulatory policy. If so, efforts to correct the resulting errors would 
produce major welfare gains.  
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